Abstract: This dissertation argues that the Government of the People's Republic of China, when it made the decision to import a quota of Hollywood films in 1994 to revive the failing domestic film industry, had different possible criteria in mind. This project has studied four of them: first, importing films that gave a negative image of the United States; second, importing films that featured Chinese talent or themes; third, importing films that were box office hits in the United States; and fourth, importing films with a strong technological innovation ingredient. In order to find out the most important criteria for the Chinese Government, this dissertation offers a dataset that analyzes a population of 262 Hollywood films released in the PRC between 1994 and 2010. For each unit, a method has been developed to compile data that determines whether the film reflects any of the four criteria, and findings in the form of yearly percentages have been drawn. Results show that, out of the four studied criteria, the two predominant reasons for China to import films were technological innovation and box office hits. This tells us that, at this point, the Chinese Government shows more interest in obtaining big revenues and learning from technically innovative American films than in delivering underlying political messages. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the content of all the films imported by China between 1994 and 2010, while integrating in the analysis variables based on the existing knowledge..
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, "The Fugitive" (Warner Bros, 1993) was the first Hollywood blockbuster to open commercially in the theaters of the People's Republic of China (referred to as China from here onwards) after a ban of more than 40 years on foreign films. The Chinese Government decided to implement a new policy consisting on importing a quota of 10 foreign films per year -mostly Hollywood movies-on a shared-revenue basis (increased to 20 films in 2001 after China joined the WTO), as a measure to revive the domestic film industry, which was in a deep financial crisis. Taking into consideration the rivalry for hegemony between China and the United States in the current international relations arena, along with the importance that the Chinese Communist Party has given since its birth to films as essential tools of propaganda, as we will see later, and the rigid statecontrolled censorship that characterizes the regime, the reasons that caused this new policy to emerge as well as the criteria of selection for the 10 mostly-Hollywood films to be imported every year out of all of Hollywood's total production (see totals in Figure  1 .1 below) become the puzzle that will be the focus of the present dissertation. Having this puzzle in mind, the central question presented by this dissertation is whether the Chinese Government follows any specific criteria when choosing the 10 or 20 Hollywood films to import every year. A priori, the central answer would be, given the rivalry with the United States, the pivotal role of movies in China to foster national identity, and the financial crisis in the domestic film industry, that the Chinese Government chooses films in three main directions. From a political counter-propaganda perspective, China chooses, first, films that either depict the United States in a negative manner or, second, that feature Chinese talent (directors/actors) and pro-China themes (thus ruling out films that depict China negatively). Third, from an economic perspective, China chooses films that were box office hits in the US to benefit from possible similar revenues in China. However, after first stages of research, a fourth possible answer has been added to the hypothesis, which is that China chooses films that represent technological innovation in order to learn from them. It should be specified here that this dissertation has not considered or analyzed the rest of films in the pool of yearly U.S. releases that were not chosen by the Chinese Government or the reasons why that might have happened.
The justification for this project comes in the context of the impact of the United States through globalization and new technologies of communication in non-democratic countries, specifically in China, for our purposes. Henry Kissinger has been quoted saying that "globalization is really another name for the dominant role of the United States" (Miller et al., 2009:50) . Moreover, Miller et al. describe Hollywood as a "cultural smoke rising from US-led struggle to convert the world to capitalism " (2009:51) , which is explained if films are understood as trans-boundary soft power vessels with underlying political messages. Soft power is conceived as the ability to affect the behavior of others to do what one wants them to do through attraction (Nye, 2009) . Taking into consideration these affirmations, and understanding how China is challenging the United States for hegemony in other aspects, this dissertation wants to analyze how China copes with the spread of the American globalization, particularly with the influx of American soft power through films within the Chinese society, and whether it can it use it to its own benefit. Thus, the hypothesis questions whether the Chinese Government has specific criteria or goals to transform Hollywood's soft power messages (films) against the US, either by showing films that depict the US in a negative manner or by showing films that favor China, so that they reinforce the nation's and the Party's ideology and do not allow foreign influences into the collective mind.
The existing literature, as we will see later, focuses mainly on why China decided to import Hollywood films, while this dissertation analyzes the how. The main cited motives by the reviewed scholars have taken a political economy approach (Wan and Kraus, 2002) , a politics and interdependence approach (Rosen, 2002) , a counter-hegemony strategy approach (Su, 2010) , and a piracy-fighting strategy approach (Wan and Kraus, 2002; Pang 2004) . However, none of the reviewed articles consider what types of films were selected for each year's quota, and this is where this study wants to collaborate to the existing knowledge.
In order to find an answer to this puzzle, a population of all the Hollywood films released in China from 1994 to 2010 has been compiled in a dataset. Thus, following a method of large-N case study (Gerring, 2004) , a population of 262 units has been gathered, each unit being a Hollywood film included in the yearly quota. Divided by samples determined on a year basis, the content of each film has been analyzed under four different variables: does it give a negative depiction of the United States; does it have a Chinese director, actor or theme; was it a box office hit in the United States; or does it have a strong ingredient of visual effects. After giving each film a Yes=1 or a No=0 in answer to the four categories, percentages have been calculated to assess the predominance of each category each year starting in 1994, and the results have been translated into four graphs per each variable and a joint graph to compare the four variables.
After interpreting the charts, while acknowledging that there are shortcomings and inaccuracies, technologically innovative films and US box office hits seem to be the predominant reasons for picking Hollywood films, thus contradicting the initial hypothesis of a political counter-propaganda motivation. However, what has become obvious is that the US production of films with visual FX, for example, is much larger than the production of films with Chinese themes or talent, which could have conditioned the four variables. Alternative possibilities of analysis have been presented in each case.
In the following pages, this dissertation starts with a theoretical framework and a historical background of the puzzle, with schematic Figures to acquaint the reader with the historical and film industry context in a dynamic manner. Afterwards, in the Literature Review section, the central question and answers of this dissertation are compared and integrated within the existing literature on the subject, finding the similarities and pointing out how can the present puzzle contribute to the current knowledge. Ensuing, the methodology proceedings to compile the final dataset (which is included in the Annex Section) are presented, contextualized and explained, followed by the display of findings and results in the shape of graphs depicting yearly percentages and the analysis of such findings. A final discussion and conclusions put an end to this dissertation.
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALIZATIONS

Theoretical Framework
"Hollywood appears in nearly all descriptions of globalization's effects (…) as a floating signifier, a kind of cultural smoke rising from a US-led struggle to convert the world to capitalism." (Miller et al., 2009: 51) The significance of this research project in the International Relations arena can find its reason to be in the relations between the United States and China. Explaining, under the Waltzian structural realism lens, the United States as the world hegemon in decline and China as possible world hegemon on the rise, any events of interaction between both powers are interesting to analyze to determine whether there is an underlying agenda to affect the balance of power between them. Taking into consideration Miller et al.'s (2009) quote above, the fact that China was the one to knock on Hollywood's door to rescue its ailing film market denotes some kind of change in the relationship dynamics between both states. Keohane and Nye (1998) understand that what has changed between both superpowers is that, in the new information age, globalization has penetrated the countries' black boxes through many new channels and new non-state actors, and now the states feel themselves obligated to react, deal, and adapt to it to preserve their power domestically and their status in the world. These concepts are very significant for the present puzzle because they would explain why China has accepted Hollywood inside its borders after so many years prohibiting it. At the same time, from the American side, to release Hollywood films in China is also not only a political interest to export the American way of life everywhere in the world (Miller et al., 2009: 64) , but also a desire to penetrate and benefit from a very juicy market. As a matter of fact, in 2009, Chinese box offices reported a revenue of USD 120 million in receipts, which experts project it could increase fifteen times by 2013 (Ibid.: 325). Therefore, the relationship between the United States and China can be argued as "complex interdependence," which Keohane and Nye use to describe a "hypothetical world with three characteristics: multiple channels between societies, with multiple actors, not just states; multiple issues, not arranged in any clear hierarchy; and the irrelevance of the threat or use of force among states linked by complex interdependence. " (2000:115) . Although both nations, as we will see, have been sharing many economic and cultural channels since the early 1990s, the irrelevancy of the threat or use of force can be argued against in this case, since both states are the top 2 countries in military spending in the world with 711 US$ billion and 143 US$ billion respectively -2011 statistics (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012) , and since they have shown opposite positioning in current conflicts such as Syria, Iran and the South China Sea, for example.
Taking these theoretical concepts and applying them to the dissertation's objectives, it is interesting to go into finding the reasons why China, such an opaque regime until the early 90s, finally started to open up to the world, despite strong ideological reservations, and how the Government dealt with this transition to maintain and preserve the Communist Party's ideals and the Chinese identity as much as possible while still benefitting from the transition to market economy.
In this sense, studying the Hollywood imports in China means only opening a small window and analyzing a broader phenomenon through one single industry in a determined time frame. However, this type of study could be done in other industries that represent interdependence between the United States and China and determine whether the process and impacts were similar. In a more generalized manner, the present study can also be applied to other authoritarian countries or countries that are not in good terms with the United States but opt to import Hollywood films or American pop culture, and study the circumstances under which the imports take place and the impact that they have in their societies and national identities.
This study can also be significant in the theoretical framework of the globalization theories, specifically on the cultural dimension of globalization (Su, 2011) . In Su's concepts, globalization has forced states to a "global-local interplay" (Ibid.: 186), and America plays an important role in most areas in the world through soft power to implement its values and way of life. As Su ponders, is America, or the West/ capitalism, the only model of modernity sponsored by globalization that every other country should follow? (Ibid.: 198) As the author believes, it is reasonable to think that China might want to learn from the US how to build soft power messages, and in the upcoming years try to gain terrain to the US in this aspect. One way to start doing so, as this dissertation wants to investigate, is to find out if China uses America's soft power against America. Sources: Su, 2010; Su, 2011; Wan and Kraus, 2002; Wang, 2007. As we can see in Figure 2 .1 above, Hollywood had already been present in the Chinese society in the 1930s and 40s, taking 75% of the market and introducing Chinese audiences to Western modernity (Su, 2011) . However, after the consolidation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Hollywood films were banned in 1950. At that point, the PRC nationalized all sectors of the film industry -production, distribution, and exhibition-and adopted the Soviet model of films as a propaganda tool (Su, 2010) .
Historical Context
b) The Communist Party and the Film Industry
"If I could control the medium of the American motion picture, I would need nothing else to convert the entire world to Communism" (Joseph Stalin, cited in Miller et al., 2009:50) Already from its early stages in the 1930s, the Communist Party in China decided from the very beginning that films would be the most important "pedagogical tool to spread its political messages" and its "most powerful propaganda machine" (Pang, 2004:105) . Once the film industry was nationalized following the Soviet model -as shown above, Soviets thought very highly of films as propagandistic tools-, the Chinese Government started producing what they called main melody films 1 as a way to generate a collective identity and to foster a feeling of "Chineseness" (Ibid.: 102) . If the Communist Party considered films as such valuable tools of identity, why did the Government decide, forty-four years later, to import foreign films again? Why did China allow its society and the national conscience of Chineseness to be challenged by the American motion picture medium? These questions will be answered below.
c) Financial Crisis of the Chinese Film Industry
In the early 90s, the Chinese domestic film industry was suffering a devastating financial crisis. The resentment and disappointment amongst the Chinese population in the post-1989 political environment drew audiences away from theaters, since they were no longer enticed by propagandistic films (Su, 2011) . Furthermore, as reflected in Figure 2 .2 below, the impact of globalization and the progressive shift from planned to market economy brought new forms of entertainment that ignited a competition with the film industry, which as a collateral damage served as a springboard for the video black market and for piracy (Wan and Kraus, 2002; Pang, 2004) .
d) The Film Industry Reform
Given this poor state of affairs, the Chinese government, through its Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT), launched a large-scale structural reform, which subscribed to the economic downturn in other sectors of the Chinese economy (Wan and Kraus, 2002) . In the spirit of this reform, the Chinese Government saw in a new policy of importing "excellent" Hollywood films (Rosen, 2002: 2) an opportunity to learn from a successful global business formula to develop the national film industry, to learn from its technique and marketing strategies, and to revive the box office revenues (Ibid.). Therefore, China liberalized the distribution and exhibition sectors in film production to import globally successful Hollywood and foreign blockbusters, although it imposed a quota of 10 films per year to protect the national industry. This quota was enlarged to 20 films per year after China joined the WTO in 2001, and to 34 films in 2012, as a result of Hollywood's pressure and lobbying. The most relevant details of the Chinese Government policy regarding opening up again to foreign films can be seen in Figure 2 .3 above.
e) Criteria for Imports
According to both Chinese official sources and to scholars on the subject, the criteria for importing foreign films ranged from films that reflected "the excellent fruits of the world civilization" and represented "contemporary cinematic achievement" (Su, 2011:43) ; "works of high intellectual and artistic merit, technical excellence, and popularity amongst Chinese audiences" (Variety, 2007) ; strict censorship and rejection of "overly violent and sexually explicit films" (Miller et al., 2009:321) ; and, according to SARFT 2 , having into consideration that "all imports must serve China's needs and national interest, and should be used for China's gains and goals (as cited in Rosen, 2002) . The stress on cinematic achievement and technical excellence cited repeatedly in these criteria explain why the variable of and technical innovation was added to the possible answers to the hypothesis of this dissertation, since it was a recurring point in different sources.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of the present thesis has been broadly analyzed by authors and scholars, who give different angles from where to understand this complicated relationship between United States and China, and who understand different motivations that brought the Chinese Government to import Hollywood films. Stanley Rosen's article "The Wolf at the Door: Hollywood and the Film Market in China from 1994-2000" (2002) tackles many issues that can be linked to this thesis through a descriptive account of the relationship between China and Hollywood between 1994 and 2000. For example, the author sees as objectives sought by the Chinese Government when deciding to import Hollywood films an economic trade-off and a matter of politics, which is linked to the content analysis of films -which the present thesis further develops. From the economic perspective, Rosen affirms that Hollywood and China are summoned in an "uneasy embrace" (2002: 2): on one hand, China needed a spark to ignite its dying film industry; on the other hand, Hollywood wanted a piece of cake of the fastest growing audience market in the world. The box office in China swept past US$2 billion for the first time in 2011, and is expected to reach US$5 billion by 2015 (Variety, 2012 . By using the Chinese idiom "same bed, different dreams" (Rosen, 2002: 2), Rosen understands that, even though both powers need each other, in reality they have different long-term aspirations: market (United States) and ideology (China). Rosen also points out politics as a factor that has always been present in deciding what films were going to be allowed in China. Thus, American studios got their approval in China from 1994 on depending on their "sincerity" with China and also depending in Sino-American relations (Ibid.: 3) . This is the reason why, in 1997, three American companies (Columbia TriStar, Disney, and MGM) were banned from China after they released three films that were considered anti-Chinese: Seven Years in Tibet (Columbia TriStar, 1997), Kundun (Disney, 1997) , and Red Corner (MGM/United Artists, 1997).
Rosen's concepts of ideology versus market are very meaningful for my dissertation, since the issue becomes how the Chinese Government integrates both contradicting objectives to maximize the economic profit. Thus, the present project investigates if, in this market move to import Hollywood films, the Chinese Government has any objective of controlling the ideology that these films carry, and whether that becomes a main concern. The rejection of films that depict China in a negative manner, as the three titles mentioned in the previous paragraph, are obvious examples that content matters. However, had these three films been in the top of the US box office (they were 59 th , 143 rd , and 86 th in 1997 respectively, according to Box Office Mojo, n.d.), a better assessment could have been made on market versus ideology, because the Chinese Government would have had a dilemma whether to import them or not.
Wendy Su, in her article "To Be or Not To Be? -China's Cultural Policy and Counter hegemony Strategy Toward Global Hollywood from 1994 to 2000" (2010), asserts that the Chinese Government sought, with its change in the cultural policy in 1994, a counter hegemony strategy as its objective. Thus, according to her, China imported Hollywood films to learn from the American industry and apply the lessons to the national industry (technical, artistic, marketing and even in exhibition). Su's central argument is that the Chinese government's strategy of combining the so-called main melody propagandistic films with newly-learnt blockbuster format to compete against Hollywood from 1994 to 2000 has proved to be ineffective in terms of film market recouped and quality of films produced, but it can be considered as partially successful when it comes to technological renovation of the film exhibition infrastructure (2010: 40). Main Melody propagandistic films, the traditional propagandistic films from the Communist Party, are now produced as big blockbusters trying to emulate Hollywood's big productions, using techniques learned from Hollywood films, with the intention to lure the audiences away from the American films. Linking Su's work to this dissertation, Su defines the objective followed by the Chinese government to import Hollywood films as a way to learn from them and the industry from a system that works globally, thus later applying it to the national in-dustry and hopefully reviving the financial problem. In the present project, however, the focus is more on the objective to import films depending on their content, given the choice that the Chinese Government has to face every year to pick 10 films out of a much larger pool of productions. However, the variable regarding technological innovation (which, as we will see later, is Variable D), would reinforce Su's concepts by asserting that China imports films with high technological ingredients.
Jihong Wan and Richard Kraus (2002) explore the objectives of the Chinese Government behind importing Hollywood films in their article "Hollywood and China as Adversaries and Allies" from a political economy perspective. In their case, the central question the authors pose is whether Hollywood and China can be accomplices in business, beyond their differences and rivalries -an issue also explored by Rosen (2002) , as we have seen.
Although the authors admit other commonly used approaches, such as cultural criticism or the artist-centered perspective, their central answer lays on the political economy approach because, they claim, it allows to understand better the context in which "political controls tighten and relax" (Wan and Kraus, 2002: 420) . The authors defend this approach because the Chinese film industry learns from and imitates the Hollywood system, as Su (2010) also stated, and because political economic reasons are the ones that best explain the change of purpose and method of state intervention in the Chinese film industry in the 90s, as hinted before with the influence of globalization in China.
Wan and Kraus' central answer with regards to whether Hollywood and China can be accomplices lies on a renegotiation of terms in their relationship. The authors agree that relaxing censorship and revising protectionist measures are two key changes in this supposed renegotiation, and they conclude that the final goal for China should be to find artistically interesting films to be shown in multiplexes, films which would "bear the stamp of both Hollywood and the Party" at the same time (2002: 434).
Wan and Kraus' article is helpful for this dissertation because it analyzes thoroughly one of the possible answers, that the Chinese Government imports Hollywood films to maximize the economic profit and strengthen the film market. The authors purposely disregard other explanations to claim that the political economy approach can result an independent explanation by itself. Within the economical framework, the authors also believe that Hollywood films will broaden the experience of Chinese audiences and that they will push Chinese filmmakers to improve their technique and craft. Furthermore, they also believe that the shared-revenue basis will favor a joint fight against piracy.
The issue of piracy is also present in Laikwan Pang's "Piracy/Privacy: The Despair of Cinema and Collectivity in China" (2004). Pang makes an interesting approach towards piracy in China, which is appointed as a collateral damage of globalization. The fact that in the early 90s Chinese audiences became progressively more exposed to all sorts of uncensored Western and American influences via illegal video or videodisc sales or Internet downloads suggests a realist metaphorical image of China's black box crumbling (Keohane and Nye, 1998) . This metaphor becomes more present when it is a fact that the Chinese Government was unable to crack down the situation and control the massive piracy. As an example, the film Titanic (20 th Century Fox, 1997) sold in China 300,000 legal copies in video and DVD, while it also sold between 20 and 25 million pirated copies on the streets (Miller et al., 2009:214) . In that sense, the official import of Hollywood films can be interpreted as a way of the Government to deal with the unavoidable, the entrance of Hollywood in China's everyday life, the penetration of globalization in the once protected Chinese identity, to give in to globalization and make a profit out of it. Wendy Su, in another article of hers entitled "Resisting Cultural Imperialism, or Welcoming Cultural Globalization? China's Extensive Debate on Hollywood Cinema from 1994 to 2007" (2011), does not see this as necessarily a bad thing that will damage the Chinese identity. She believes that, with the Hollywood example, the Chinese people need to build their own "modernization process and national identity" (2011: 186). In fact, Su (2011) presents the domestic debate that China suffered after the entrance of Hollywood (as summarized in Figure 3 .1 below), and how Hollywood succeeded at dominating most of China's box offices, thus causing a crisis on the Chinese domestic industry that was only solved when, through a change of policy, the Government opened the door to Chinese coproductions with foreign companies in 2001 after the WTO accession.
For the purposes of this thesis, though, the idea to keep is that another motivation for the Chinese Government to import Hollywood films could be, as Pang (2004) and Wan and Kraus (2002) stated, that Chinese audiences were already enjoying Hollywood films through piracy, so by importing these films they kill two birds with the same stone: satisfying their audiences' taste, and fighting piracy (while making a significant profit). • Rounding things up, the reviewed literature serves to give a very detailed description on the historical context and on a list of objectives that answer why the Chinese Government decided to welcome Hollywood to take on the Chinese collective identity. As we have seen, these ranged from economical reasons, political reasons, piracy-fighting reasons, and learning reasons to apply to the domestic industry. Taking into account these arguments, this dissertation wants to collaborate to the existing knowledge by delving into how did the Chinese Government choose the Hollywood films. Picking up on the politics issue suggested by Rosen (2002) , on the technological innovation argued by Su (2010) , and on the box office reasoning provided by Wan and Kraus (2002) and Pang (2004) , the dissertation focuses on the content analysis of the actual imported films, and on determining whether they have a specific message depicting the US in a negative manner, whether they depict China in a positive manner or feature Chinese talent, whether they are US box office hits, or whether they are vivid examples of technological innovation. The methodology section that follows will give the details on how this analysis has been developed and what findings it has brought.
METHODOLOGY
Framework: Visual Content Analysis
In order to find the adequate method to analyze what types of films the Chinese Government chooses and if there is an objective behind the choice, literature regarding visual content analysis has been accessed, specifically Banks (2001) and Berg (2004) . Berg understands content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of messages" (2004: 267). Banks, on his end understands that "the properties of the images, and the interpretation of readers, are not fixed. The story that the image communicates -internal narrative-is not necessarily the same as the narrative the image-maker wished to communicate" (2001: 11).
These concepts are understood for the dissertation in the sense that the message that US production companies intended to send with their films can be understood differently by Chinese audiences, specially since, according to Banks, audiences, who had usually been considered by social research as "passive vessels filled with more or less wholesome messages", are progressively being seen as "active subjects engaged in the construction of meaning" (Ibid.: 80). Therefore, this project wants to figure out whether the Chinese Government is constructing new meaning for the imported Hollywood films to reinforce its propagandistic message to the population. Following Berg's concepts (2004: 269) , this research project is a mixture of manifest content ("surface structure presented in the message") or quantitative data, and latent content ("deep structural meaning conveyed by the message") or qualitative data. Furthermore, following the principles of grounded theory ("categories are discovered by the examination of the data" (Ibid.: 273), the Technical Innovation variable was added after it was noticed that the Chinese Government gave special importance to this factor when researching about the criteria for imports.
The Method Description: Large-N Case Study
The method to study the hypothesis is that of a large-N case study. Following Gerring's concepts, a case study is an "in depth study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units " (2004: 341) . For this reason, the cases for this study have been considered to be each Hollywood film released in China from 1994 to 2010, instead of understanding China as a single case. A unit is described by Gerring as a "spatially bounded phenomenon (…) observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time" (Ibid.: 342). Thus, a population of 262 units has been divided into 17 samples, one per year included in the time frame. Even though Gerring understands a population is "comprised of a 'sample' (studied cases) as well as unstudied cases" (Ibid.), for the present study only the studied cases have been considered due to the large amount of information. The unstudied cases in this project would represent the available Hollywood films that were not chosen by the Chinese Government or that were censored. However, the method applied to the studied cases could be also applied to the unstudied ones for a more thorough research for the presented hypothesis.
Initial Idea and Research Process
The initial idea for the methodology was to make a large-N study consisting on a database containing the universe of Hollywood films released in China on the established import quotas (10 films per year from 1994 to 2000, and 20 films from 2001 on). Therefore, the idea was to have around 270 films. The initial date was set to 1994 since it was the year The Fugitive was imported, and the end date was set to 2010 since that would serve as a sample period and would ensure all the box office information was in and accurate in the consulted sources (some numbers might still be missing for 2011). However, at the time to do the research, several issues and a few restrictions altered the final N.
First of all, access to information regarding what American films have been imported every year has been particularly difficult to find, since it is not an easy-access type of data, since I do not speak Chinese, and since I could not travel to China or US for my research. That being said, information regarding releases between 1994-2000 was drawn from an article by Stanley Rosen (2002) , and information regarding releases between 2001 and 2010 were found by checking the yearly box offices in mainland China at the Chinese entertainment database Enbase (EntGroup, n.d.) and the Chinese website MTime.com, which was accessed using Google Translator since it did not offer a version in English.
It should be mentioned that, in the data collected from these sources, the number of titles given never matched the 10 or 20 quota, except for 1996, 2000, and 2003. The numbers could be affected for different reasons: in 1994, the only imported film was The Fugitive; in 1995, the total number of imported films was 9, but two Hong Kong films were discarded for the dataset, since they did not have American participation; in 1997, as mentioned earlier, three American companies were banned from China after they released three films that were considered anti-Chinese; in 1999, after the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, China suspended film imports until mid-2000, therefore only 6 films were imported in that year (Su, 2010) . In the year 2000, the total count is of 11 instead of 10, which might be because of a source inaccuracy since information was obtained from Rosen (2002) and Enbase Entertainment Database for that year.
It must also be mentioned that starting in 2001, besides the 20-film quota on a shared-revenue basis, the Chinese Government also authorized a 30-film quota of foreign films on a flat rate, as it was shown previously in Figure 2 .3. Since some of the films in this new pool were also American, when checking Hollywood films in the box office numbers provided by Enbase, in the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 the number of US films was well-above 20. The inaccuracy in these cases is due to the fact that an official source or classification of what films were under the 20-quota and which ones under the 30-quota has not been found, for which there may be films in the dataset that were actually imported under the 30-film flat rate quota. Even though this represents a step back on the initial research intentions, any American film that is imported serves the purpose of this thesis, since what we are looking at is content. Therefore, the dataset is not as pure as initially intended, but the samples reflected per year can help towards proving the hypothesis right or wrong. It must be emphasized that, since the information does not come from an official source or from the US production companies, its veracity is attached to the credibility of the obtained sources. For the optimal elaboration of this project, were it to be replicated, information should be withdrawn as much as possible from official Chinese sources or US distributors.
At any rate, only films with American participation (films either produced or co-produced by American companies) have been considered for this dataset. However, films that have been co-productions between U.S. and China -a practice that started after the WTO adherence-have also been disregarded in this dataset, since it can be interpreted as the content of those films was approved by both sides before production. These films were Pavilion of Women (2001) 
The Dataset
After the initial remarks, once all the titles were obtained, they were introduced in a dataset, and the following data (quantitative and qualitative) was observed for each unit/film.
a) Quantitative Data
Unit number 1.
: number of the case in relationship to the whole population. Year of release in China 2. (Rosen, 2002; EntGroup, n.d.; and Mtime, n.d.) . Number of case within a year/sample.
3.
China's yearly box office position 4.
(EntGroup, n.d.). Film title 5. (Rosen, 2002; EntGroup, n.d.; and Mtime, n.d.) . Year of production 6.
(Internet Movie Database, n.d. , in million USD (Box Office Mojo, n.d.).
b) Qualitative Data
Villains.
12.
List of the main villain(s) in the film. N/a means no significant villain has been encountered (Internet Movie Database, n.d.; American Film Institute, n.d.; and Rotten Tomatoes, n.d.) . Chinese Cast/Crew or Theme.
13.
Lists any Directors, Actors, themes related to China. N/a reflects films without any Chinese talent/theme (Internet Movie Database, n.d.). Position in the yearly US box office. 14.
The number specified reflects the position the film acquired in the yearly box office (Box Office Mojo, n.d.). Visual FX crew.
15.
The number reflects the number of crewmembers in the Visual FX team of the film (Internet Movie Database, n.d.).
c) Variable Criteria and Percentage Calculation
In order to analyze whether China chooses films that depict the US in a negative manner (Variable A), that feature Chinese talent/theme (Variable B) , that are box of-fice hits in the US (Variable C) or that have technological innovation (Variable D), the following considerations have been regarded towards making the content analysis process as objective as possible, as recommended by Berg (2004) .
As a calculating procedure, each unit in the population can either be a "yes" or a "no" to each category, which has been translated for statistical purposes to a 1 (for yes) or a 0 (for no). After all the numbers have been gathered, yearly percentages have been recorded and translated into a graph, as we will see later, to read the tendency over time. A priori, the highest percentages will indicate that the variable is more likely to be the objective behind the Chinese Government.
Variable A
Answer: China imports films that give a negative depiction of the United States (and in turn, of democracy and capitalism)
Films have been given a Yes=1 in this category when they have a villain that is a rogue member of a United States public institution, a large corporation, or when the genre of the film is a Disaster or Post-Apocalyptic. The villains are specified in column 12 and Disaster/Post-Apocalyptic remark can be found under the Genre/Subgenre column (Column 7). The films that do not respond to any of these 3 observations have been given a No=0. The reasoning behind using US/corporation villains is because they denote the wrong functioning of American-backed institutions or companies. Regarding the genre, Disaster or Apocalypse is understood here as a metaphor in the context of the previously mentioned balance of power concept: the world nowadays, under the capitalist globalist system and still under American hegemony, is not functioning and it needs to be "destroyed", thus giving path to a new beginning, a new system (Chinese hegemony).
Variable B
Answer: China imports films that feature Chinese actors or directors, or a Chinese Theme in a positive perspective.
For this category, films with directors or actors from Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Malaysia (with a Chinese ethnic background) have been given a Yes=1, as well as films that include Chinese themes (they are set in China, ancient China or that include martial arts), as reflected in Column 13. For the purpose of this present study, this category has not considered the films which depict China negatively, or films that have Chinese ingredients (directors, actors, content) but that have been censored and not imported by the Chinese Government for different reasons, a deeper analysis within the variable that could be further developed in a broader study. Co-Productions between the US and China have been discarded from the database because it is understood that if both countries embarked on a joint production, the content of the film had to be approved beforehand on both ends.
Variable C
Answer: China imports films with the higher box office revenues in the states.
Films that were in the top 10 from 1994 to 2000 and films that were in the top 20 from 2001 to 2010 have been given a Yes=1, following the information displayed in Column 14. The reasoning behind this is that if answer C was correct, China should have imported in a block the top ten box office hits from the American list when the quota was 10-films per year, and the top 20 when the quota increased. Films that were released in China that failed to make those positions have been given a No=0. Since the year considered for the box office is the one when the films were released in the US, some films in 2001 have been considered a No=0 despite the fact they were top 20, since in the year they were released in the US the criteria was still the top 10 (year 2000 and before).
Variable D
Answer: China imports films with technological innovation.
For this category, technological innovation has been identified with visual effects, since it is a department that includes computer graphics, manipulation of the images, mixing real life footage with created footage, etc. In short, it is the department where technological innovation is more "visible" when watching a film and that arguably draws more audiences to the theaters.
In order to find a way to quantify this variable, films with a visual effects crew superior to 100 members have been given a Yes=1, and films with less than 100 members have been given a No=0, following numbers listed in Column 15. The 100-crew member threshold has been determined in order to strain the films where visual effects have a leading role, and thus have a large team devoted to them.
d) Inaccuracies
Although this inaccuracy does not directly affect the outcome of the dissertation, it should be mentioned that box office numbers in China come from 2 sources, one in million RMB from 1994 to 2000 (Rosen, 2002) , and the other in million USD from 2001 to 2010 (EntGroup, n.d.). Exchange rate from august 18 th , 2012 was applied to convert the first source into million USD. Although the quantities might not be fully accurate, since the exchange rate was slightly different each year, it has been converted just as an indicative number.
FINDINGS OR RESULTS
After registering the percentages as calculated in the A, B, C, D columns in the dataset (cells in grey at the end of each year), the findings have been graphed, and they have been complemented by the interpretative results, as follows. It must be said that for 1994 the percentage was either 0% or 100%, since only one unit, The Fugitive, was accounted in that sample year. Variable A By looking at the graphic, contrary to what it was believed to be a strong objective before starting the research for this project, depicting negatively the United States does not seem to be a strong motive to pick films, and the tendency along the years seems to be diminishing below 20%, specially considering that the number of films imported gets higher after 2001.
Variable
In order to do this research more accurately, a similar procedure of analysis of variables should have been done to a random sample of US films released each sampled year, and compare both results and see if there is a similarity or difference in films that depict US in a negative manner in both countries. If the percentage was higher in China, then we could argue that Variable A is significant for the Chinese Government when making a choice of films every year. Furthermore, as a third way of analysis, if a variable labeled films that depict positively the United States, negative and positive results could be compared and assessed whether there was a predominance. Variable B
The low and irregular percentages achieved by Variable B along the analyzed years (it does not surpass 35%) can be read in two ways: one, that China did not import many films with Chinese talent or themes; or two, that the US did not produce many films with Chinese talent or themes and China imported what was available. However, if we have into account that China imported a total of 31 films with Chinese talent/theme in the time frame analyzed, as depicted in the dataset available in the Annex, and that of this number only 10 were top 10 or top 20 Box Office hits in the US, this suggests that the Chinese Government sought to import Chinese films regardless of their success in America.
To enhance this research scenario, the suggestion would be to take the total number of US films produced in one year, and from that number subtract the percentage of films with Chinese talent/theme. Then we could contrast the number of films the Chinese have imported compared to the number of Chinese-themed films that were available, and determine if they imported the majority of them or not.
Furthermore, it must be reminded at this point that co-productions between the US and China have been omitted from this database, since it is believed that they would affect Variable A (both parties would agree to content before hand). Aware that this criterion affects Variable B, it has been considered that Variable A was more important regarding the hypothesis of this dissertation. Given the fact that none of the Variable C Given the previously exposed condition for this variable that if China wanted to import US box office hits they would take the top 10 or top 20 block and import them, this graphic shows that the Chinese Government does not completely follow this criteria, while it is still significant. Even though the tendency starts high because in 1994 there is only one film, we can see that along the years it stabilizes between the 60% and the 40%, meaning that box office gains is a strong ingredient but that censorship or other criteria avoid the percentage to get higher. 
Variable D
After looking at the four graphics, choosing films with Technological Innovation seems to be the highest regarded objective followed by the Chinese Government. The findings depicted by Figure 7 show an increasing tendency along the years, after a drop in 1999 that can be explained by the halt in Hollywood imports after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the US.
These findings can be attributed to the method applied to gather the data and the percentages. If I had more time to analyze "technological innovation" in the population of films, I would probably make an assessment on the equipment used to make the films and the budget allocated to the technical part of the production, since just recording high Visual Effects teams may be considered a subjective way to analyze the data.
It can also be said that the curve of Variable D is higher than the others because the US makes a lot of films with Technological Innovation (or a lot of films with large Visual FX crews). In that case, the same method used here should be applied to the US top 10/20 from 1994/2010, and afterwards compare percentages. If the curve of the US "Technological Innovation" graph and the China one were similar, we could argue that the predominance of Variable D is not because China picks this determined type of films, but because there is a larger quantity of them offered by the US. If the US curve was lower than China, then we could argue that China does indeed pick films with "Technological Innovation" and that technology is a significant factor for China. According to these numbers, it would seem that Variable D (technological innovation) is the most predominant objective the Chinese Government seeks when importing Hollywood films, followed by Box Office hits, anti-US messages and lastly Chinese-Themed movies. However, as it was hinted in the prior paragraphs, the production of films with Chinese content is different than the production of films with Technological Innovation, etc.
Comparison of the Four Variables
Thus, if I could do this research again, I would either apply each variable with the same method to the US top 10/20 box office lists from 1994 to 2010, and compare results with China, or I would find new variables that are more specific to film content and disregard the variables regarding box-office or technological innovation: these categories, for example, could be pro-US, anti-US, pro-China, and anti-China. In order analyze the films' content as objectively as possible, I would design a questionnaire after having watched all films to send to a series of film critics and theorists from China, the U.S. and neutral countries, to assess what is the message behind the films and to contrast opinions.
It should be mentioned at this point that some films have not scored in any of the proposed four variables, such as #17 A Walk in the Clouds 4 (Twentieth Century Fox, 1995), #24 Sabrina (Paramount Pictures, 1995) , or #45 Double Jeopardy (Paramount Pictures, 1999), to name a few. To explain this, a new fifth variable could be introduced, which would describe films that might have been pushed or forced as imports by US companies to China in a pack with other more successful films, as a way to find market for smaller movies that otherwise would not have been chosen. Needless to say, this dissertation has considered only four variables to study, but any new dissertation could identify new variables and use this proposed method to find other results.
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION
China knocked on Hollywood's door in the early nineties to salvage its failing domestic film industry. In a globalization context where technology made it easier for soft power messages to travel across borders, China realized that it could no longer remain isolated from the world to protect its ideology, and joined the game of cultural globalization. However, in an international relations context, where both states are 3. Because films can score in more than one variable, the yearly percentages or total average percentages do not add up to 100%. 4. The number before the title denotes the unit number in the dataset.
allegedly the future superpowers in dispute for hegemony, China found its way to control the US influence on its population, by establishing a yearly film quota to protect its national industry. Furthermore, China used Hollywood films to learn from a successful model, not only from the technological and business aspects, but also as a soft power effective tool, and to apply it to the domestic production (Su, 2010) .
The existing literature has identified the strategies behind the Chinese change of policy as economic, political, learning, or counter-piracy. This dissertation has contributed to the general knowledge by analyzing, a propos of soft power, the message contained in the selected films, and whether these could have been used as counterpropaganda against the US and in favor of China.
The results have shown that China imports primarily films that represent technological innovation and films that bring big revenues to the box office above any other objectives. The reading behind this is that China, for now, is learning how to make films that earn big box offices, and is learning technological innovations to apply to its domestic cinema. The next step, as Su (Ibid.) defends, could be that China will aim to send its own soft power messages, and to reinforce its superpower condition regionally and internationally through Chinese films, under the hopes these acquire a Hollywood-like status. As In the years to come, what will be interesting to follow is what China does to compete with Hollywood at a soft power level, and whether it is able to find a successful formula. In the future, besides the American way of life, will global box offices crave the Chinese way of life? 
